Going South: Lessons from an Historic Project Failure

Abstract

NASA's successful conduct of the Apollo Program greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States and remains broadly accepted as America's gift to all Mankind. NASA's accomplishments continue to amaze the world. With the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) Americans once again tasked NASA to carry out a project that is expected to provide inspiration and economic stimulus to the United States and to the world. In preparation NASA has thoroughly examined space program precedents. There is, however, another precedent which has not been examined in this context but whose scope and environment in many ways parallel the VSE. This project was initiated by a team that had, ten years before, successfully completed an effort that, at a cost of $151 billion (2008 values), had pushed the envelope of technology, brought economic growth, established their country as the world leader in engineering, and been broadly accepted as their country s gift to Mankind. The new project was again inspired by popular desire to enhance national prestige and make yet another major contribution to Humanity. The new effort was predicted to require eight years and $156 billion (2008 values). However, after eight years and expenditures of 80% beyond the baseline, the project collapsed amid bankruptcy, political scandal, and criminal prosecution. This paper applies current aerospace project metrics, such as earned value analysis, to review the strategic decisions in this historic failure and describe its ultimate collapse. Key mistakes are identified, and lessons are drawn which may prove useful in guiding the VSE.