| タイトル | Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility |
| 著者（英） | Kato, Ryo; Tsuruga, Takayuki |
| 発行日 | 2020-03 |
| 発行機関など | The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University |
| 刊行物名 | Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers |
| 巻 | 1078 |
| 開始ページ | 1 |
| 終了ページ | 32 |
| 言語 | eng |
| 内容記述 | Pecuniary externalities in models with nancial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing economic agents excessive risk taking. We extend the Diamond and Rajan (2012) model of banks with the production factors and explore how a pecuniary externality a¤ects a bank s leverage. We show that the laissez-faire banks in our model take on excessive risks compared with the constrained social optimum. Our numerical simulations suggest that the crisis probability is 2- 3 percentage points higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the constrained social optimum. |
| キーワード | Financial crisis; Liquidity shortage; Maturity mismatch; Credit externalities; Financial regulation |
| URI | https://repository.exst.jaxa.jp/dspace/handle/a-is/956179 |
